What Will Self-Aware Computer Systems Be?John Mccarthy, Stanford UniversityMccarthy@Stanford.EduHttp://Www-Formal.Stanford.Edu/Jmc/August 9, 2004
- • Darpa Wants To Know, And There’s A Workshop T
- • The Subject Is Ready For Basic Research.
- • Short Term Applications May Be Feasible.
- • Self-Awareness Is Mainly Applicable To Programs With
- tent Existence.
WHAT WILL SELF-AWARE SYSTEMS BE AWARE- • Easy aspects of state: battery level, memory available,
- • Ongoing activities: serving users, driving a car
- • Knowledge and lack of knowledge
- • purposes, intentions, hopes, fears, likes, dislikes
- • Actions it is free to choose among relative to external
- straints. That’s where free will comes from.
- • Permanent aspects of mental state, e.g.
long term- • Episodic memory—only partial in humans, probably
- animals, but readily available in computer systems.
HUMAN SELF-AWARENESS—1- • Human self-awareness is weak but improves with age.
- • Five year old but not three year old.
I used to think- contained candy because of the cover, but now I kno
- crayons. He will think it contans candy,
- • Simple examples: I’m hungry, my left knee hurts from
- my right knee feels normal, my right hand is making
- • Intentions:
- Zealand some day. I do not intend to die.
intend to have dinner,
intend to- • I exist in time with a past and a future. Philosophers
- lot about what this means and how to represent it.
- • Permanent aspects of ones mind: I speak English and
- French and Russian. I like hamburgers and caviar. I cannot
- my blood pressure without measuring it.
HUMAN SELF-AWARENESS—2- • What are my choices? (Free will is having choices.)
- • Habits: I know I often think of you. I often have breakfast
- the Pennsula Creamery.
- • Ongoing processes: I’m typing slides and also getting
- • Juliet hoped there was enough poison in Romeo’s
- • More: fears, wants (sometimes simultaneous but incompatible)
- • Permanent compared with instantaneous wants.
MENTAL EVENTS (INCLUDING ACTIONS)- • choose to believe
- • remember
- • consider
- • Infer
- • decide
- • forget
- • realize
- • ignore
MACHINE SELF-AWARENESS- • Easy self-awareness: battery state, memory left
- • Straightorward s-a: the program itself, the programming
- guage specs, the machine specs.
- • Self-simulation: Any given number of steps, can’t do
- “Will I ever stop?”, “Will I stop in less than n steps in general—in
- less than n steps.
- • Its choices and their inferred consequences (free will)
- • “I hope it won’t rain tomorrow”. Should a machine
- be aware that it hopes? I think it should sometimes.
- • ¬Knows(I, T T elephone(M M ike)), so I’ll have to look
WHY WE NEED CONCEPTS AS OBJECTS- We had ¬Knows(I, T T elephone(M M ike)), and I’ll have
- Suppose T elephone(M ike) = “321-758000. If we write
- ¬Knows(I, T elephone(M ike)), then substitution would
- ¬Knows(I, “321-758000), which doesn’t make sense.
- There are various proposals for getting around this.
- advocated is some form of modal logic. My proposal is
- individual concepts as objects, and represent them b
- symbols, e.g. doubling the ﬁrst letter.
- There’s more about why this is a good idea in my “First
- theories of individual concepts and propositions”
WE ALSO NEED CONTEXTS AS OBJECTS- We write
c : p
- to assert p while in the context c. Terms also can
- using contexts. c : e is an expression e in the context
- The main application of contexts as objects is to assert
- between the objects denoted by diﬀerent expressions in
- contexts. Thus we have
c : Does(J oe, a) = SpecializeActor(c, J oe) : a,- or, more generally,
SpecializesActor(c, c0, J oe) → c : Does(J oe, a)) = c- Such relations between expressions in diﬀerent contexts
- using a situation calculus theory in which the actor is
- itly represented in an outer context in which there is
- one actor.
- We also need to express the relation between an external
- in which we refer to the knowledge and awareness of
- and AutoCar1’s internal context in which it can use “I”.
SELF-AWARENESS EXPRESSED IN LOGICALFORMULAS—1
- Pat is aware of his intention to eat dinner at home.
- c(Awareness(P at)) : Intend(I, M M od(AAt(HHome), E
- Awareness(P at) is a context. Eat(Dinner) denotes the
- act of eating dinner, logically diﬀerent from eating Steak
- M od(At(Home), Eat(Dinner)) is what you get when
- the modiﬁer “at home” to the act of eating dinner. Intend
- says that I intend X. The use of I is appropriate
- context of a person’s (here Pat’s) awareness.
- We should extend this to say that Pat will eat dinner
- unless his intention changes. This can be expressed b
¬Ab17(P at, x, s) ∧ Intends(P at, Does(P at, x), s→ (∃s0 > s)Occurs(Does(P at, x), s).- in the notation of (McCarthy 2002).
- • AutoCar1 is driving John from Oﬃce to Home. AutoCa
- aware of this. Autocar1 becomes aware that it is low
- gen. AutoCar1 is permanently aware that it must ask p
- to stop for gas, so it asks for permission. Etc., Etc. These
- are expressed in a context C0.
Driving(I, J ohn, Home1)
∧Aware(DDriving(II, J J ohn, HHome)
uel(AAutoCar1)))∧OccursBecomes(W ant(I, SStopAt(GGasStation1)))∧
- • Does the lunar explorer require self-awareness? What
- the entries in the recent DARPA contest?
- • Do self-aware reasoning systems require dealing with
- opacity? What about explicit contexts?
- • Where does tracing and journaling involve self-awareness?
- • Does an online tutoring program (for example, a program
- teaches a student Chemistry) need to be self aware?
- • What is the simplest self-aware system?
- • Does self-awareness always involve self-monitoring?
- • In what ways does self-awareness diﬀer from awareness
- agents? Does it require special forms of representation
- Some Philosophical Problems from the Standpoint of
- John McCarthy and Patrick J. Hayes
- Machine Intelligence 4, 1969
- also http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/mcchay69.html
- Actions and other events in situation calculus
- John McCarthy
- also http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/sitcalc.html.